时论广场》柯文哲访美的涟漪（方恩格 Ross Darrell Feingold）

民众党主席柯文哲认为，他的民调还会成长。（资料照，郭吉铨摄）

在蔡英文总统和争取国民党提名的郭台铭访美后几天内，有意参选总统的台湾民众党主席柯文哲也正访问美国。一般情况下，笔者不鼓励潜在总统候选人访问美国，因为风险可能大于收益。

即使柯文哲最近公开发表他在两岸、国防和外交方面的政策，台湾民众党的网站亦有少数相关英文资讯，但是民众党在台湾以外的世界仍缺乏知名度。

即使柯文哲在这些议题上已经做了一些功课，但要说服美国利益关系者相信柯对于这些政策的掌握度，以及让他们看见台湾选民对其支持度，对柯来说会是一大挑战。国民党接下来的总统提名候选人也将面临相同的问题。

2019年3月，时任台北市长的柯文哲也访问了华府，当时传言他将在该年决定是否参选2020年1月的总统选举。后来他决定不参选，大概只有他知道当时访问华府的过程是否成为他做出此决定的关键要素。众所皆知，美国政府官员以及在智库和大学里关注台湾事务的人士，对他作为总统候选人并未给予正面的评价。

去年6月，就在国民党主席朱立伦访问华府的几天前，蔡政府宣布了新的「美台21世纪贸易倡议」，以此作为美国未将台湾纳入印太经济架构后的安慰奖。尽管如此，蔡政府成功地将其推销给民众，宣称这是美台关系「坚若磐石」的另一个例证。

同样在柯主席访美前，蔡总统刚从成功的美国过境之旅返回台湾。柯主席很难将同等程度的风采带回台湾。以下是柯文哲访美期间值得关注的看点：

在他的公开演讲中，柯主席会对九二共识发表什么言论？他可能会避免提及此议题，可能会说九二共识可以成为台湾民众党两岸政策的一部分，或者他也有可能会拒绝接受九二共识并批评国民党，又或者他可能会专注于他对两岸政策的愿景，包括他最近提出的「政治上不可能是『一个中国』」。

拜登政府是否会匿名批评柯文哲，就如同欧巴马政府在2011年对时任民进党主席蔡英文访问华府时做出的批评呢？在拜登政府负责亚洲政策的官员中，对于民众党、柯主席，以及他在担任市长8年期间的成就（这也是台湾民众党网站未分享的内容），了解的人相对有限。

柯文哲是否会像他在2019年访问华府时一样，在政府机关前拍照打卡？台湾的选民关心的是他在里面会见了谁，而不仅是他po出的观光客照。

哪些级别的美国政府官员及哪些国会议员会与柯主席会面？最近在蔡英文总统过境纽约市和洛杉矶时，重要的参众议员已经与她会面。对于与一位对他们来说政策内容仍是个谜的台湾潜在总统候选人会面，美国政府官员们的利益是什么？

最后，民众党是否能对蔡政府或民进党的批评有效回应？民进党政治人物并不介意在外国人面前批评柯文哲。例如，在2019年布拉格市长决定取消与北京的姊妹市关系并访问台湾时，时任民进党立委余宛如在推特上用英语表示「比起与现在亲北京的台北，或许与其他县市建立姊妹市关系会比较好。」此外，例如柯文哲曾经被多次指控参与活摘器官移植案的争议，他的政治对手们肯定会在今年再次提起，就像他们在2018年柯文哲竞选台北市长连任时所做的一样。

笔者认为，台湾的在野党应该优先确定总统候选人、提高在民调中的支持度、筹集资金，并在目前所拥有的立法院、市、县议会，以及民众党在新竹市所拥有的市长职位中表现好，这仍然是促使美国利益相关者对民众党表示好评的最佳方式，但这些都无法通过访问美国来实现。

握有执政党的优势，民进党得以在美国投入资源，期望能得到美国政府的「背书」。尽管身为副总统、民进党主席以及总统候选人的赖清德访问美国是不必要的，但如果真的变得必要，他可以选择辞去副总统职务，以免他的职称太过敏感。毕竟，无论明年1月的选举结果如何，他的副总统任期都将于2024年5月20日结束，因此辞去副总统职务将使他能够效仿民众党和国民党，进行自己的华府访问。

（作者为美国共和党前亚太区主席，译者：许淳恩）

全文

Taiwan People’s Party Chairman Ko Visits the United States

By Ross Darrell Feingold

Former Asia Chairman, Republicans Abroad

Twitter: @RossFeingold

Days after President Tsai Ing-wen and Chinese Nationalist Party presidential hopeful Terry Gou returned to Taiwan after visits to the United States, presidential hopeful and Taiwan People’s Party Chairman Ko Wen-je is visiting the United States. Generally, this author discourages potential candidates for president from visiting the United States, as the risk might be greater than the reward.

Chairman Ko’s China, defense, and foreign policies are unknowns to the world outside Taiwan, even if the Taiwan People’s Party website includes a little bit of information in English, and Ko has recently discussed these issues in presentations and media interviews.

Unfortunately for Ko, even if he has policies on these issues, he faces an enormous challenge in convincing stakeholders in the United States that he sufficiently understands these important issues, or that Taiwan’s voters agree with Ko’s policy proposals. The eventual Chinese Nationalist Party candidate will also have this challenge.

In March 2019, then Taipei City Mayor Ko Wen-je also visited Washington DC, amid speculation he would decide later that year to run for president in the January 2020 election. Only Ko Wen-je knows whether the outcomes of his visit to Washington DC that year were a factor in his decision not to run for president. As far the public knows, United States government officials and the Taiwan “watchers” at think tanks and universities did not say anything positive about him as a presidential candidate.

In June last year, days before Chinese Nationalist Party Chairman Eric Chu visited Washington DC, the Tsai Administration “flooded the zone” with actions to demonstrate its achievements in U.S.-Taiwan relations, including the announcement of the new “U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade”. Although this was only a consolation prize after the United States did not include Taiwan in the Indo Pacific Economic Framework, the Tsai Administration was able to sell it to the public as another example of “rock solid” U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Similarly, shortly before Chairman Ko visit to the United States, President Tsai just returned to Taiwan after her successful transit visits. As compared to President Tsai, it is unlikely Chairman Ko can obtain anything better from the United States to bring back to Taiwan.

Here are five things watch for during Chairman Ko’s visit to the United States:

In his public speeches what will Chairman Ko say about the 1992 Consensus? Ko might avoid it, he might say that it can be part of the Taiwan People’s Party’s China policy, or he might reject it and criticize the Chinese Nationalist Party. He might instead focus on his vision for a China policy which includes his recent comment that “politically it’s not possible for there to be One China”.

Will a Biden Administration official anonymously criticize Chairman Ko the way an Obama Administration official criticized then-Democratic Progressive Party chairman Tsai Ing-wen when she visited Washington DC as a presidential candidate in 2011? Few Biden Administration officials responsible for Asia policy are familiar with the Taiwan People’s Party, Chairman Ko, or even Ko’s achievements during eight years as mayor (something the Taiwan People’s Party fails to share on its website).

Will Chairman Ko take photos in front of government buildings in Washington DC like he did during his 2019 visit? Voters in Taiwan want to know who he meets, not whether he was physically in front of government buildings.

What level of US government officials will meet Chairman Ko, and which Members of Congress will meet Chairman Ko? Important Members of Congress recently met President Tsai Ing-wen when she transited New York City and Los Angeles. What is their interest in meeting a Taiwan presidential candidate whose policies are a mystery to them?

And finally, can the Taiwan People’s Party effectively respond to the Tsai Administration or Democratic Progressive Party (or Democratic Progressive Party friendly outside organizations in Washington DC) “flooding the zone” with criticism about Ko and the Taiwan People’s Party? Democratic Progressive Party politicians are willing to criticize Ko Wen-je in front of foreigners. In 2019, when Prague’s mayor decided to cancel sister-city ties with Beijing and visited Taiwan, Democratic Progressive Party Legislator Karen Yu tweeted in English, “instead of establishing sister-city ties with now pro-Beijing Taipei, other cities or counties might be better”. There are also the periodic allegations raised about Chairman Ko’s alleged involvement in prisoner organ transplants in China, which Ko’s political opponents are sure to again bring up this year just they did when Ko ran for re-election as Taipei City mayor in 2018.

This author believes that the priorities of opposition political parties in Taiwan should be to identify its candidates for office, increase its standings in the polls, raise money, and perform well in the offices it currently holds whether in the Legislative Yuan, or city or county councils (and for the Taiwan People’s Party, the one municipal government head it holds in Hsinchu City). This is the best way to prompt stakeholders in the United States to say nice things about the Taiwan People’s Party, but none of this can occur via a visit to the United States.

The Democratic Progressive Party has the advantages of incumbency, and thus can afford to spend resources in the United States in the hopes of an “endorsement” from the United States government. Although this author thinks it is unnecessary for Vice President, and Democratic Progressive Party Chairman and presidential nominee, William Lai to visit the United States, if it really becomes necessary he can simply resign the vice presidency so that his job title will no longer be sensitive. After all, no matter what happens in the election next January, his job as vice president ends on May 20, 2024. Resigning as vice president will allow him to follow the Taiwan People’s Party and Chinese Nationalist Party with his own visit to Washington DC.