时论广场》中美第三次高层对话 兵棋推演系列6：AUKUS曝台矛盾点（方恩格Ross Darrell Feingold）

美、英、澳三国组成AUKUS防卫联盟，联盟的首项重大计划是协助澳洲建造8艘核动力潜舰。(图/美联社)

此次《中国时报》主办的兵棋推演模拟美、中两国可能发表联合声明，且两国高层在即将到来的G20峰会上对谈之情境，笔者在参与此次精彩的兵推过程中，看见了几个台湾必须谨慎思量的问题。

首先值得一提的是，举办此次兵推活动的数小时后，澳洲、美国和英国宣布了其针对中国所联手签订的「AUKUS」安全协议。兵棋推演的主办方在选题上本已准备充分，为此次推演设计了许多可能影响双方谈判的变因与考量，但也难以事先预料到现实中会出现「AUKUS」这样的联合安全协议。若在此次兵推的议题讨论中纳入此安全协议，整个讨论的风向可能会大幅转动，美中双方领导人直接对话的可能性将大大减低。

结合现实来说，台湾政府是否能在第一时间获得这样的国安相关情报，对于台湾在国际间的生存至关重要。以此次兵推为鉴，若台湾政府在当事国公开对外宣布「AUKUS」之前已能掌握此情报，便能及早推演出更切实际的美中对话情境，进而权衡台湾在其中的位置。

此消息一出，似乎也让台湾政府措手不及，在台湾境内反核的同时，却一面热切欢迎澳洲核子潜艇来台湾附近海域巡防。这说明了台湾政府在此议题上并未准备好一个适切的回应，产生了自相矛盾(dichotomy)。

第二个看点是美国在中美联合声明中提到台湾议题时所惯用的语汇。尽管中国对川普政府及部分拜登政府近来在台美关系正常化的许多举措表达不满，但美国无论是在单边或双边公开声明中的措词始终符合其一中政策的标准框架。

至于在美台的双边声明中，近来出现一些越来越细致的措词来指涉美国与台湾之间关系强度的增长，但美国在对中国的声明中目前为止，并未出现过突破性或挑战中国的字眼。

第三，台湾确实被中国视为核心利益，但当我们从台湾角度来看美中关系时，容易因为抱持着过高的期待，而忽略了台湾只是美中双方诸多分歧与不同意见的众多议题之一，因此我们常会看到台湾出现在美中联合声明的篇幅，并没有像台湾媒体所期待的比例来得大。有许多关心台湾的人经常过度戏剧化描述台湾在美中谈判桌上的地位，例如外媒最近刊登的台湾是国际间战略和经济的一个大彩蛋，这对台湾的现况实在没有帮助。在笔者看来，台湾应该注意，避免过度膨胀自身的重要性（develop an inflated sense of its importance）。

第四，我们若仔细检视此次美中高层对谈中，拜登政府的国安团队人员，便能发现其中主要是政治任命的官员组成（而非职业外交官），这些人通常的立场会是对中方抱持正面态度，也就是希望与中方展开接触与对话，而并非与中方交恶。这是典型的民主党与（和拜登总统的）自由开放派外交政策风格。无论是在阿富汗、伊朗还是台湾问题上，拜登政府通常表现出愿意与另一方对话的开放态度，这也是造成有些人会质疑他的外交政策缺乏审慎性（prudence）。

最后，在这次兵棋推演过程中，无论是美中双方对于台湾、香港、新疆、南海、中国「一带一路」、贸易冲突，或人权议题上抱持分歧意见，双方至少都同意美中领导人应该要在G20会议进行直接对话。然而我们必须要考虑到，这样的中美高层会面对台湾的风险在于，即使拜登公开表示他担心中国对台湾武力威胁，拜登仍然极有可能再度重申美国将坚守一中政策，并强调不会与台湾建交，或与台湾结成军事同盟。

为了台湾的利益与政治考量，台湾政府经常谴责台湾的政治人物与中国官方安排任何会面，笔者认为台湾政府也应该口径一致，向外国政府传达同样的信息。（作者为美国共和党海外部亚太区前主席）

全文：

Simulation Once Again Reveals Risk for Taiwan

By Ross Darrell Feingold

Former Asia Chairman Republicans Abroad

The recent simulation hosted by China Times at which the two sides attempted to reach the modest goal of issuing a joint statement and arranging a meeting for President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping to meet at the upcoming G20 summit once again revealed several truths that Taiwan must humbly confront.

First the exercise occurred hours prior to the announcement by the Australia United Kingdom and United States about their new AUKUS security alliance directed at China. The exercise organizers did an admirable job of introducing breaking news events to the exercise that might affect the negotiating positions of the two sides and the outcome of the exercise. Neither organizers nor participants could anticipate the AUKUS announcement but had it occurred shortly before or during the exercise the dynamics would be significantly different. The likelihood that the two sides could issue a joint statement or agree to a leaders meeting would have been significantly reduced. This demonstrates that in the real world for Taiwan the ability to obtain intelligence about national security related developments is crucial to its survival. Although we can speculate whether Taiwan was aware of AUKUS prior to the public announcement the likelihood is that Taiwan was unaware and had to react after the announcement just as other governments in Asia did.

The dichotomy of Taiwan’s government which opposes the domestic use of nuclear power welcoming the possibility of nuclear-powered Australian submarines patrolling the waters near Taiwan indicates that the Taiwan government did not have a response prepared beforehand.

Secondly in negotiating the language of a joint statement it was no surprise that with regard to Taiwan each side insisted on the usual language that China and the United States typically use when issuing statements following bilateral meetings. This wording is standard in such statements notwithstanding China’s displeasure at the many actions to normalize U.S. – Taiwan relations taken by the Trump Administration and more recently to some extent by the Biden Administration. But even if the United States sometimes makes minor adjustments to this wording ultimately in unilateral or bilateral public statements with China the United States continues to make the usual references to the Taiwan Relations Act and the United States’ One China policy.

Although bilateral U.S.-Taiwan statements usually refer to the strength of the relationship in ever-more elaborate words a breakthrough for how the United States is willing to describe its relationship with Taiwan when making unilateral statements or joint statements with China is yet to be achieved.

Third although Taiwan remains a core interest for China Taiwan was one among the numerous issues that both sides discussed and sought to include in the joint statement. Certainly the Chinese side had many issues about which it wanted to express its disagreement with United States policies. Similarly the United States also had numerous issues it wanted to discuss. When looking at U.S.-China relations and specifically the issue of Taiwan in the context of U.S.-China relations from our vantage point in Taiwan we often make the mistake of forgetting that Taiwan is one among many issues in the U.S.-China relationship. Taiwan is not the only issue China wants to discuss in bilateral meetings and thus there is limited time in discussions or space in joint statements for Taiwan. It does not help that well intentioned foreign friends of Taiwan often dramatically refer to Taiwan using descriptions as a foreign media report recently did that Taiwan is an immense strategic and economic prize. In this author’s view Taiwan should be careful that it does not develop an inflated sense of its importance.

Fourth the United States team which consisted of political appointees and not career diplomats attempted to maintain a positive attitude and engage with the Chinese side rather than break off discussions. This is consistent with the typical Democratic Party foreign policy (and President Biden’s) style. Whether the issue is Afghanistan Iran or Taiwan the Biden Administration willingness to talk with the other side will continue to fuel critics concerns about the prudence of its foreign policies.

Finally the two sides very much wanted to arrange a meeting at the upcoming G20 between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping. At least in the simulation no issue appears to prevent the desire to meet whether Taiwan Hong Kong Xinjiang the South China Sea concerns about China’s actions along the Belt and Road or in the Pacific trade disputes or human rights in China. Such a meeting is risky for Taiwan because even if Biden states concerns about China’s threats to use force against Taiwan there is a likelihood that Biden will also reiterate that the U.S. will adhere to its One China policy and will not establish diplomatic relations or enter into a military alliance with Taiwan. If Taiwan’s government thinks it is risky for Taiwan politicians to meet with Xi Jinping for the sake of consistency and to protect Taiwan’s interests it can consider to openly deliver the same message to foreign governments too.