时论广场》美国如何看国民党新主席(方恩格Ross Darrell Feingold)
美国学者戴雅门(Larry Diamond)(左)曾拜访前新北市长朱立伦(中)。(许毓仁提供)
国民党主席选举结果揭晓,随着朱立伦的上任,国民党也面临必须厘清其两岸关系主张的局面。除此之外,国际也在关注,台湾该如何在美、中、日关系中取得政治定位上的平衡,而国民党在现况之下,又会推出什么具建设性的创见,以在野角色协助改善台湾的困境。
在台湾政界流行创造简单易记的短语口号,但如「和中、友日、亲美」这类看似简短有力的词汇概念,对台湾人或许朗朗上口,但对于不谙中文的外国人士而言,在阅读转手翻译后的文献时,遇到「和中: peace with China」、「友日: friendly to Japan」、「 亲美: close to the United States」 这类的浓缩词汇时,时常难以理解完整的论述。多年来笔者花了很多时间在向不谙中文的外国学者友人解释这些语汇的来龙去脉,因而在此建议新任国民党主席带领国民党推出更具体、更具建设性的完整对外论述,而不像以往只是创造一些方便媒体下标的简短口号,否则只会让想要了解台湾的外国友人看得「雾煞煞」。
在国际间,谁担任台湾最大在野党的主席或许并非主要焦点,但在全球对中国不满声量逐渐升高的情况下,越来越多的政客在批评中国,时而也发表支持台湾的言论,但这些友善的互动除了带来温暖之外,到底产生多少的实际成效?外国政治人物与台湾官员在推特上发文或互赞转发,甚至对台进行了大张旗鼓的访问,但迫于种种现实压力,这些外国支持通常都是雷声大雨点小,很少能真正转化为对台湾有实质帮助的行动。
国民党新任主席应当要注意,避免也跟风专注在社交媒体的友善陷阱中,不需要花太多的时间跟只会以贴文来支持台湾的外国友人交相往来,应该要专注在对台湾选民及外国政府有影响力的有力人士建立友好关系,首要之事便是在上任后尽速跟AIT接洽正式会面,若能直接请到AIT处长会晤新任党主席,不但能显示美国当局对于该党的尊重,也能给新任主席一个漂亮的出场式。
在国际间逐渐恢复正常旅行往来以后,新任党主席也应设法说服外交部,在外国政要访台行程中加入与国民党的会晤。即将来台参访的法国参议员访问团便是一个试水温的好时机,可以展现新任党主席在处理国际事务上的能力与魅力。
在建立国民党的国际新形象之上,新任党主席更应该谨慎排序内部党务的优先顺序、大力整顿党内低迷气氛,其中包括平抚党内的团结问题、10月对立委陈柏惟的罢免案、12月举行的公投、解决党所面临的财务危机、以及2022年地方选举的选战策略等。
同时国民党也要重新振作、扮演好在野党的角色,在选民关心的议题上提供有建设的政见、监督执政党,并且提出国民党自己的政策与主张。缺乏清晰有力的国家政策与理念,是目前美国与国际社会眼中国民党的弱项。首先国民党必须说服台湾人民对他们产生信赖与建立起友好观感,其次才能进一步改变外国政府对国民党的既有评价。
站在美国的角度,上述国民党主席的待做清单大多与美国无直接关联,而就算美国政府对国民党的态度有转变,也无助于新任党主席在上述事项的执行与决策。由国民党所进行、近期可能会得到美国深切关注的议题,大概只有针对美猪进口的公投案。美国多年来持续向马政府与政蔡府要求台湾放宽美猪进口禁令,也就是说对美国而言,主要重点在于美国猪肉产品准入台湾市场,这是一题经贸议题,与台湾哪一个政党当政关系不大。
如果公投通过,新任党主席将需要准备好一个口径一致的对策,来对美国解释他们为什么推动这项进口禁令。若到时候国民党又同时支持台湾与美国展开其他自由贸易协定,很可能会出现自相矛盾的窘境。
最近蔡英文总统与日本自民党党魁候选人高市早苗进行了一场公开视讯会议,这说明了民进党和日本的自民党关系友好且密切,除非国民党再次成为执政党,或者展现出国民党的对中主张也能符合日本利益,否则自民党不太可能会抛下民进党转而对国民党主动示好。
朱立伦的首要任务是向全世界解释清楚他的两岸论述,也就是解释他的九二共识与马英九的九二共识到底有何异同。其次,若朱真的兑现他在美国华府开设国民党代表处的竞选政见,他也必须明确定义这个党代表处的目标与功能、部署好预算与人员配置,确保其有效运作。鉴于国民党对台湾国防问题的主张,该党的驻美代表最好是一名有军事背景的退役军官,这位人选除了必须有能力清晰阐明国民党在国防军购上的野心,也需要针对蔡政府向美国采购来的军事装备提出更好的替代采购方案。
在前次总统和立委选举中,执政的民进党政府打出川普牌,让台湾选民相信美国政府与台湾关系日益紧密,展现出民进党似乎比其他的政党更能贴近美国、以保护台湾人的权益,因而获得大胜。从美国的角度来看,以民进党的反中态度和在台湾聚集的人气,要说服让当时的川普政府靠拢民进党和蔡英文总统是很合理的。国民党若也想要在选战中得到美国的支持,新任党主席接下来首先必须要让国民党得到选民支持的好成绩,才足以得到美国当局的青睐。(作者为美国共和党海外部亚太区前主席)
全文:
The New Kuomintang Chairman’s Success Does Not Depend on the United States
By Ross Darrell Feingold
Former Asia Chairman Republicans Abroad
Eric Chu Li-luan’s victory in today’s Kuomintang chairman election will bring renewed attention to the perennial question in Taiwan politics as to what the Kuomintang’s China policy is and how the Kuomintang views Taiwan’s current and future political status. From the perspective of the international community it will also once again bring renewed attention to how the Kuomintang proposes to balance relations between China Japan and the United States. Hopefully the new chairman will avoid the frequent habit in Taiwan in which politicians condense an important policy into word couplets such as “peace with China friendly to Japan close to the United States” 「和中、友日、亲美」 and instead he will announce a more substantive policy proposal.
We should keep in mind that the international community (other than the United States) does not really care who is the chairman of Taiwan’s largest opposition political party. Amid global discontent with China an increasing number of politicians are critical of China and sometimes make supportive statements about Taiwan. Often such supportive statements do not translate into substantive action on behalf of Taiwan (tweets and visits to Taiwan should not be considered substantive action). The new Kuomintang chairman should be careful to avoid the trap of praising tweets by foreigners who talk about Taiwan but take no substantive action to make Taiwan more secure. Similarly the new Kuomintang chairman should avoid wasting time on videoconferences or meetings with the many foreign scholars who claim to be China and Taiwan experts but who have no influence over Taiwan voters or the policies of foreign governments.
Although the new chairman should meet with the American Institute in Taiwan as soon as possible to preserve his own and the party’s dignity he should insist that the AIT Taipei Office director attend the meeting. Assuming normal travel resumes soon the new chairman should also try to persuade the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to include a meeting with the Kuomintang on the itinerary of visiting foreign political dignitaries. The upcoming visit of French senators will be a good test of the new chairman’s ability to do this.
However the new chairman should also keep in mind that these events take time away from more important priorities making time spent on international affairs a distraction from the new chairman’s priorities.
What are the priorities for the new Kuomintang chairman? The priorities include repairing the internal disunity that arose during the chairman election a successful recall of Legislator Chen Po-wei in October successful referendums in December raising money to address the Kuomintang’s financial crisis candidate selection and election strategy for the 2022 local elections. and generally providing policy ideas for the issues voters care about. A loyal opposition can be critical of the Tsai Ing-wen administration but still needs to propose its own policy ideas. The United States and international community perceive the Kuomintang as having failed to provide good national policy ideas but this should be fixed for the sake of Taiwan’s people and not to change the views of foreign governments.
The above priority items are irrelevant to the United States. Similarly an improvement in how the United States government views the Kuomintang won’t help the new chairman achieve successful outcomes with these priorities either. One exception is the referendum to prevent imports of pork that contains ractopamine. The United States pressured both the Tsai Ing-wen and Ma Ying-jeou administrations to relax Taiwan’s ban on ractopamine pork from the United States thus for the United States this issue has little to do with Taiwan’s political parties and is for the most part about obtaining market access for the U.S. pork industry. If the referendum passes the new chairman will need a coherent explanation as to why the Kuomintang supported an import ban. If at that time the Kuomintang supports a free trade agreement with the United States he will need to explain why American pork was singled out for a ban.
The recent videoconference between President Tsai Ing-wen and Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party leadership candidate Takaichi Sanae shows that the Democratic Progressive Party and Liberal Democratic Party enjoy warm ties and the Liberal Democratic Party sees little value in a relationship with the Kuomintang. Unless and until the Kuomintang again becomes Taiwan’s ruling party or unless and until the Kuomintang’s China policies are similar to the Democratic Progressive Party then Liberal Democratic Party politicians are unlikely to be friendly towards the Kuomintang.
For Chu a priority will be to explain to his United States interlocutors his China policy and whether it differs from or is consistent with former president Ma Ying-jeou and other Kuomintang politicians’ reliance on the “1992 Consensus” as the basis for relations between Taiwan and China. If Chu follows through on his plan to open a Kuomintang representative office in Washington DC the reasons for doing so must be clear the office’s deliverables achievable the budget sufficient and the personnel appropriate. Given past concerns about the Kuomintang’s commitment to national defense the representative will ideally be a former career military officer who can articulate that the Kuomintang supports sufficient defense spending even if it has concerns about the utility and cost of specific weapons systems the Tsai administration has in recent years agreed to purchase from the United States.
It is true that during the most recent presidential and legislative election campaign the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party government emphasized to voters the increasingly strong relations between the Trump Administration and Taiwan. However this was one among many Democratic Progressive Party selling points that gave Taiwan’s voters confidence that the Democratic Progressive Party protects their interests better than the Kuomintang or other options. From the United States perspective the Democratic Progressive Party’s policies and popularity made it easy for the Trump Administration to support the Democratic Progressive Party and Tsai Ing-wen. If the new Kuomintang chairman wants United States support he should first ensure he has the support of Taiwan’s voters.