时论广场》冒进的外交作为 收益小风险大(方恩格 Ross Darrell Feingold)
英国《金融时报》报导,蔡英文总统30日将在美国纽约一场华府智库活动演讲,并接受颁发「全球领导力奖」。图为2015年时任民进党主席的蔡英文(右)在华盛顿演讲。(本报资料照片)
台湾外交最近有很多好消息。外交部长吴钊燮访问位于华盛顿特区外的美国在台协会总部、蔡英文总统即将过境美国,以及她会见众议院议长麦卡锡,都使蔡政府得以宣称在外交政策上取得胜利。韩国空军飞机再次在高雄补充燃料,以及韩国外交部长呼吁维持台湾海峡现状的声明都令蔡政府愉悦,即使这些动作并非是韩国对于中共攻击台湾时会对台援助的承诺。且在最近几周,美国和日本首次在日本举行「铁拳」军演,进一步证明日本在防卫问题上越来越认真。
然而,在2023年的前两个月,台湾的外交也遭遇挫折,可见台湾的外交政策风险也很大。
一、在非洲:2020年,台湾成为少数几个在未被国际承认但自治的索马利兰开设代表处的国家之一,随后进行了援助和双边正式访问。有些台湾人一厢情愿的称这种关系为「准邦交」,且蔡总统还称台湾与索马利兰为「共享民主自由的价值,是理念相近的伙伴」。然而,阿卜迪总统推迟了去年的选举并延长了任期,而数百人便在随后的动荡中丧生。另外,尽管史瓦帝尼国王去年10月对台湾进行了国是访问,但据中央社报导,史瓦帝尼总理上周也对台湾进行了国是访问。6个月内两次对台访问的同时,史瓦帝尼国内发生了反对国王绝对君主制的抗议,及今年年初一名亲民主活动人士被谋杀的事件。台湾很有可能因为支持非洲两个武力镇压政府而被指控为不民主行径。
二、太平洋岛国:2月7日,所罗门群岛马莱塔省省长苏达尼在省议会投票中被逼下台。苏达尼直言不讳地批评总理苏嘉瓦瑞在2019年决定与中华民国断交而与中华人民共和国建交,并鼓吹马莱塔宣布独立(如果发生这种情况,可能会使马莱塔与中华民国建交)。台湾政府在2021年为身患重病的苏达尼提供医疗服务,导致了他与总理的关系恶化。最近有消息称,密克罗尼西亚与台湾讨论了建交的可能性,以换取台湾提供的大量金援。但也许台湾应该把在太平洋抗中的任务留给大国澳大利亚和美国。
三、东协:2月21日,新加坡外交部长维文在北京会见国台办主任宋涛,维文在脸书贴文上称其为老朋友,以及据新加坡外交部称,维文重申了新加坡的「一中政策」。2月27日,维文在新加坡国会表示,新加坡不希望被迫在中国和美国之间选边站。在此之前,东协外长于2月4日发表声明称,「东协会在促进台湾海峡各方之间的和平对话时发挥建设性作用」。虽然台湾外交部发表声明对东协外长表示感激,但事实上东协国家在台湾问题上的立场十分明确,即使台湾有「新南向政策」也没有改变这一点。
四、乌克兰:2月24日中国发表《中方关于政治解决乌克兰危机的立场》。美国某学者警告说,该提议与结束乌克兰战争无关,反而是与中国为了设定赢得对台战争的条件有关。不过,乌克兰总统泽伦斯基积极回应,表示希望与习近平会面,商讨这一提议。尽管台湾曾援助乌克兰并频繁声明台湾与乌克兰站在一起,乌克兰仍很有可能选择与中国维持关系而非与台湾发展关系。
五、尼加拉瓜:3月2日,「尼加拉瓜人权专家组织」向联合国人权理事会提交的报告认定,尼加拉瓜警察和亲政府团体在2018年4至9月期间的反政府抗议活动中犯下了危害人类罪。在此期间,台湾与尼加拉瓜尚有邦交,而尼加拉瓜陆军总司令阿维莱斯上将还在2018年的3月拜访了蔡英文总统,他后来因涉及侵害人权而被美国制裁。除此之外,2018 年台湾向尼国警长迪亚兹捐赠了数百万美元(据称用于医疗援助)。不幸的是,台湾在此期间仍继续支持尼加拉瓜政府。
笔者经常指出,台湾的外交目的不可能一蹴而就。换句话说,其他国家将台湾视为一个正常国家对待,而不是一个值得特殊对待的国家。偶尔,台湾与另一个受到威胁的国家「站在一起」,或者说台湾与其他国家共享自由民主价值有时是有用的。但最终其他国家还是会优先考虑自己的利益,更多时候是利用台湾。最近的事件再次证明了这一点,并提醒,台湾的安全取决于与美国的关系,且冒进的外交作为,其收获是有限的。
(作者为美国共和党前亚太区主席,许淳恩译)
原文:
Foreign Policy Springs Forward, Falls Back
By Ross Darrell Feingold
Former Asia Chairman, Republicans Abroad
Twitter: @RossFeingold
There’s plenty of recent good news for Taiwan’s foreign policy. Foreign Minister Joseph Wu’s visit to the American Institute in Taiwan’s headquarters outside Washington DC, President Tsai’s upcoming transit of the United States (consistent with past transits), and her meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (even if it is in the United States and not Taipei) will allow the Tsai Administration to claim foreign policy victories. South Korea’s air force planes again refueling in Kaohsiung and statements by Korea’s foreign minister calling for the status quo to be maintained in the Taiwan Strait are welcome, even if it is not a commitment by South Korea to come to Taiwan’s aid if China attacks. Also in recent weeks, the United States and Japan are for the first time holding the Iron Fist military exercise in Japan, further proof that that Japan is becoming more serious about defense issues.
However, in the first two months of 2023, Taiwan’s foreign policy has also experienced setbacks, which shows how risky foreign policy initiatives can be for Taiwan.
1. Africa: In 2020 Taiwan became one of the few countries to open a representative office in the unrecognized but self-governing Somaliland, with aid and bilateral official visits following afterwards. Some in Taiwan foolishly call the relationship “diplomatic recognition in waiting”(准邦交)and President Tsai called Taiwan and Somaliland “like-minded partners who share the values of democracy and freedom”. However, President Muse Bihi Abdi'delayed last year’s election and extended his term in office, and hundreds have died in subsequent unrest. Separately, even though Eswatini’s King made a state visit to Taiwan last October, the Central News Agency reported that Eswatini’s Prime Minister made a “state visit” to Taiwan last week. Two state visits to Taiwan within six months comes amid protests against the King’s absolute monarchy and the murder earlier this year of a pro-democracy activist. There is a significant risk that Taiwan will be accused of supporting two repressive governments in Africa.
2. Pacific Island Countries: On February 7 Daniel Suidani, the Premier of Malaita Province was ousted in a provincial assembly vote. Suidani is an outspoken critic of Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare’s decision in 2019 to derecognize the Republic of China and to recognize the People’s Republic of China, and advocated for Malaita to declare independence (which if it occurred, would have likely resulted in Malaita established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China). The Taiwan government provided medical care to Suidani in 2021 when he was suffering from a serious illness, which worsened his relationship with the prime minister. More recently is news that Federated States of Micronesia and Taiwan discussed the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations in return for a large aid pack provided by Taiwan. Perhaps Taiwan should leave countering China in the Pacific to the major powers, Australia and the United States.
3. ASEAN: On February 21, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan met in Beijing with Taiwan Affairs Office Director Song Tao whom Balakrishnan called his old friend in a Facebook post (a rare meeting between the Taiwan Affairs Office Director and a foreign minister), and according to Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Balakrishnan reaffirmed Singapore’s “One China” policy. On February 27 in a speech at Singapore’s Parliament, Balakrishnan said Singapore does not wish to be forced to choose sides between China and the United States. Balakrishnan’s statements about Taiwan followed a February 4 ASEAN Foreign Ministers statement that “ASEAN stands ready to play a constructive role in facilitating peaceful dialogue between all parties” in the Taiwan Strait. Although Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued its own statement expressing its appreciation for the ASEAN foreign ministers, the reality is ASEAN countries position on Taiwan is quite clear, and the “New Southbound Policy” has not changed this.
4. Ukraine: On February 24, China published “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis”. Experts warned that the proposal has little to do with ending the war in Ukraine and everything to do with setting the conditions to win a future war over Taiwan. However, Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky responded positively, and said he plans to meet Xi Jinping to discuss the proposal. There is a risk that Taiwan’s aid to Ukraine, and frequent statements that Taiwan stands with Ukraine, will still result in Ukraine maintaining a relationship with China and not developing one with Taiwan.
5. Nicaragua: On March 2, a report to the United Nations Human Rights Council authored by the “Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua” determined that crimes against humanity were committed in Nicaragua by police and pro-government groups during anti-government protests between April and September 2018. This was a period when Taiwan still had diplomatic relations with Nicaragua, and Commander in Chief of the Nicaraguan Army General Julio Cesar Aviles Castillo visited President Tsai in March 2018 (he was later sanctioned by the United States for his involvement in human rights abuses) and in 2018 Taiwan donated millions of dollars to (supposedly for medical aid) to Police Chief Francisco Diaz (who was already under United States sanctions). It’s unfortunate that Taiwan continued to support the Nicaragua government during this period.
This author often opines that Taiwan cannot achieve everything it wants in its foreign policy goals. In other words, other countries treat Taiwan as a normal country rather than a country that deserves special treatment. Periodically saying that Taiwan “stands with” another country under threat or that Taiwan has shared values of freedom and democracy with other countries is sometimes useful. Ultimately other countries will always put their own priorities first, and sometimes might take advantage of Taiwan. Recent events once again demonstrate this, and are a reminder that Taiwan’s security depends on its relations with the United States, and there’s limited value from foreign policy adventures.