时论广场》莱猪过关 拜登仍会对台湾下「临时禁制令」（方恩格 RossFeingold）

蔡英文接见美国联邦众议院退伍军人事务委员会主席高野访问团。（总统府提供）

美国的法律制度中，有一个法律名词叫做「临时禁制令」（temporary restraining order, TRO）的特殊命令，这是由法官所签发、在特定时间范围内施行或阻止某行动的法律程序。通常法官必须在特殊前提之下（如被告可能做出的某项行为会造成不可修复的伤害）才能发出这道临时禁制令。而最近几个月，拜登政府则看似也对台湾发出了一些「临时禁制令」。

在「台北经济文化办事处」欲更名为「台湾代表处」这件事情上，拜登政府似乎就对台湾政府发出了「临时禁制令」。由于拜登总统在担任参议员期间有参与《台湾关系法》的立法过程，很熟悉台美之间来往的语汇，拜登政府并未同意让「台湾」取代「台北」办事处，这点并不令人意外。拜登政府尽量避免与中国在气候变迁，以及伊朗核武协议等议题合作上，增加不必要的要素来激怒中国，也不足为奇。今年年初台湾企图在盖亚那设立「台湾办公室」未果之后，台湾政府只好在立陶宛设立「台湾代表处」。

「民主峰会」则是拜登政府对台湾发出「临时禁制令」的另一明显例子。数月来各方猜测，蔡英文总统是否亲自或透过视讯出席会议，但拜登政府最终并未邀请她。政务委员唐凤和驻美代表萧美琴代表台湾虽是当之无愧，但仍埋下了在以后的类似场合，台湾政府将不会由总统出席的隐忧。

尽管美国商务部、国防部、国务院及贸易代表处的高阶政府官员在2022下半年度安排多次访问韩国、日本和东南亚等国，但拜登政府并没有访问台湾的计划。在川普政府任期的最后几个月，访台的美国政府官员则有卫生和公共服务部部长阿札尔（Alex Azar）和主管经济、能源和环境事务的国务次卿克拉奇（Keith Krach）。川普任期最后一周，驻联合国大使克拉芙特（Kelly Craft）原订访台，却在最后一刻取消。这是很好的提醒：《台湾旅行法》与此类访问是否成行无关，因为外交政策的决策权通常属于总统，并不能由美国国会单方面决定。拜登政府没有访台计划，基本上是拜登总统的决定，而有鉴于这种外交突破的访问会为台湾带来可观的国外公关价值，牵制住访台此事，似乎是拜登政府对台湾施加「临时禁制令」的手段之一。

尽管如此，蔡英文政府与拜登政府的关系仍是不错的，台湾其他政党也就只有干瞪眼嫉妒的份。国民党两岸政策以及对禁止进口莱猪公投的支持，为其改善与美国会议员及拜登政府的关系造成了巨大阻碍。而民众党和台北市市长柯文哲在两岸、国防和其他议题上的政策立场，到目前为止，对美国的利害相关人来说都是懵懂不清。朱立伦和柯文哲将于2022年访美，但也不太可能改变蔡政府所受到的华府善意，也不太可能从而得到华府对国民党和民众党的善意。

放眼2022年，首先，即使反莱猪进口公投未过关，也不一定保证台美双边贸易交流会立刻突飞猛进。此外，要是美政府接下来未邀请台湾参加环太平洋军事演习，或者针对未来蔡总统或副总统赖清德可能访问中美洲或加勒比海过境美国的行程中，哪些公开活动是获准进行的、哪些是不准许的，后者可以说是名符其实拜登政府可能对台实施的「临时禁制令」手段。

顺带一提，拜登政府如何应对副总统赖清德这位寻求民进党提名的下届总统候选人，任何对他提供的过境待遇或期待在美的活动安排，都将会十分敏感，美国如何对之释出友善，却又不明显表示为特定人物背书，将会是一有趣的观察点。

美国对台某些动作发出「临时禁制令」，在于告诉台湾并无法从良好的台美双边关系中向美国予取予求。或者更正面一点来看，美国把台湾视作一个正常的国家，而不是一个应该要给予特殊待遇的国家。希望台湾政治人物在接下来与美国打交道时，能抱持着这样的底气。

（作者为前美国共和党亚太区主席）

英文全文：

Did the Biden Administration Issue Taiwan a Temporary Restraining Order in 2021?

By Ross Darrell Feingold

Former Asia Chairman, Republicans Abroad

Twitter: @RossFeingold

In some legal systems, including in the United States, a "temporary restraining order" （TRO） is a legal document issued by a judge that forces or prevents an action for a specified time frame. Usually, specific criteria must be present for a judge to issue a TRO, such as the likelihood of irreparable harm. Did the Biden Administration place a TRO on Taiwan in recent months?

Certainly, for the proposed name change of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office （TECRO） to Taiwan Representative Office （TRO）, the Biden Administration placed a TRO on Taiwan. President Joe Biden, as a Senator, was "present at the creation" of the Taiwan Relations Act. His reluctance to replace "Taipei" with "Taiwan" in the office name is not a surprise, nor is it a surprise if his view is that this would unnecessarily provoke China at a time when the Biden Administration seeks to cooperate with China on climate change and the Iran nuclear weapons program among other issues. Taiwan had to settle for a "Taiwanese Representative Office" in Lithuania, after the failed effort earlier in the year to open a "Taiwan Office" in Guyana.

The Summit for Democracy is another obvious example of a TRO the Biden Administration placed on Taiwan. Despite months of speculation about the possibility President Tsai Ing-wen would attend in person or via video conference, the Biden Administration did not invite her. Minister Without Portfolio Audrey Tang and Representative to the United States Hsiao Bi-khim were worthy representative for Taiwan, though the danger is that if this event occurs again, the precedent is that Taiwan will not be represented by its president.

Despite numerous visits to Korea, Japan and Southeast Asia in the second half of 2022 by senior United States government officials from the Commerce Department, Defense Department, State Department, and the United States Trade Representative, no such visit to Taiwan has occurred during the Biden Administration. In the final months of the Trump Administration, US government officials who visited Taiwan included the Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar, and Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Keith Krach. The visit of Ambassador to the United Nations Kelly Craft in the final week of the Trump Administration was planned but cancelled at the last minute. This is a good reminder that the Taiwan Travel Act is irrelevant to whether or not such visits occur, as foreign policy decision making authority generally is the President's and cannot be dictated by the United States Congress. The absence of such visitors from the Biden Administration is a decision made for the most part by President Biden, and, given the enormous domestic and global public relations value for Taiwan that is gained from such break through visits, withholding it from Taiwan appears to be one way the Biden Administration has placed a TRO on Taiwan.

Of course, notwithstanding the above, relations between the Tsai Administration and Biden Administration are fine, and Taiwan's other political parties can only look on with envy. The Kuomintang's China policy, and its support for the referendum to prohibit the import of pork with ractopamine, creates enormous hurdles for it to improve its relations with Members of the United States Congress as well as the Biden （or the next） Administration. The Taiwan People's Party and Taipei City Mayor Ko Wen-je, and its policies on China, defense, and other issues, as of now are a mystery to stakeholders in the United States. Visits to the United States in 2022 by Kuomintang Chairman Eric Chu and Taiwan People's Party Chairman Ko Wen-je are unlikely to change the enormous amount of goodwill the Tsai Administration has in Washington DC or gain goodwill towards the Kuomintang and Taiwan People's Party.

In 2022, items on which the Biden Administration might place a TRO on Taiwan include resumption of trade negotiations notwithstanding the result of the ractopamine pork referendum, denying Taiwan an invitation to the RIMPAC exercise, or the nature of public activities in the United States should President Tsai or Vice President William Lai transit the United States on their way to or from Central American or the Caribbean. As a potential candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party's nomination for president in 2024, how the Biden Administration handles a stopover in the United States by Vice President Lai will be just as interesting to watch as a stopover by President Tsai.

The "TRO" on some items notwithstanding, otherwise good bilateral relations indicates that Taiwan will not be able to obtain all that it wants from the United States. Or in other words, the United States treats Taiwan as a normal country rather than a country that deserves special treatment. Hopefully Taiwan's politicians will keep this in mind when dealing with the United States in 2022 or afterwards.